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1 December 2007 - "What was happening outside America 1861-1865?”Meetings › 1 December 2007 - "What was happening outside America 1861-1865?”  By Jeremy Mindell Wars rarely happen in a vacuum. The American Civil War was no exception. To understand why the south lost one needs to look as much at European diplomacy as southern strategy. Almost all rebellions or wars which involve a weaker state prevailing over a strong one involve foreign help in one help or another be that diplomatic financial materials or direct intervention.Dutch Revolt Take the example of successful revolts such as the Dutch against the Spanish in the period 1568-1648 the Dutch where taking on a foremost power of the late 16th and early 17th century. In order to succeed they needed a combination of courage, perseverance, geographical advantages, allies and distractions for the Spanish. In the short period where the Dutch faced the Spanish on their own they came close to defeat but normally the Dutch where either able to find allies such as the German Protestants or England or they where able to distract Spain such as with the French or the Swedes. Therefore final victory was never possible for the Spanish despite their overwhelming military and financial superiority. Vietnam War The Vietnam War is a more recent conflict which caused soul-searching in the United States not only whether to prosecute the war but also to how a relatively small country could withstand the might of the United States. Of course Vietnam never stood alone having the generous support of the Soviet Union as well as other allies in the communist block. Moreover America was never able to utilize its superiority in the conflict. The Vietnam War also caused some soul searching because it exploded the myth which many Americans subscribed into that a larger power would inevitably defeat a smaller one. Indeed when you consider there are 192 states in the UN many of whose independence was founded on successful revolts, the curiosity appears to be that the South failed to gain its independence. The American Revolution The wonder of the American revolution might be that it succeed against significant odds the Americans themselves were divided with approximately 1/3 loyalist 1/3 patriots and 1/3 neutral. Their sources of finance was always uncertain their leadership divided and the generalship none to distinguished. They lost many more battles than they won and any objective account of the American Revolution would not see it as an inevitable success but one achieved considerably against the odds and yet the contrast in the diplomatic position between that of the revolutionary states and that faced by the British was decisive. The French encouraged the American rebels from the moment that the ink was dry on the peace of Paris in 1763. They supplied money and materials to the rebels well before the declaration of war on 1778. Once the war became open Britain was faced with a war on several fronts as the Dutch Spanish and Prussians joined an armed league against Britain. The Spanish overtly joined the French in the war against the British in order to regain West Florida. Britain itself was threatened and crucially had no allies in Europe to distract the French. In both the war of Austrian succession and the Seven Years War the British had had allies on the continent to keep the French at bay. One should be in no doubt that without French assistance, first in material and weaponry and then with a direct military intervention, that Washington could not have succeeded. The flow of money which eventually bankrupted the French monarchy helped keep the rebellion going even when military success for the American rebels was rare. In looking at the decisive Yorktown campaign the French contribution can not be overestimated, the French gained the vital domination of the Chesapeake bay for the vital six weeks in which the Yorktown denouement was fought and it was French forces who provided the necessary stiffening of the continental army In no other war before or after 1775-1783 were the British faced a serious emergency abroad and a European threat at the same time until the Second World War. This second overstretch resulted in the fall of Singapore. Despite Britain sending capital ships to Singapore, it was much lower on their priority list than the other theatres of war. The War of 1812 It is sometimes difficult to remember in this age of the United States being the foremost global power, that until the end of the 19th century America was seen as a sideshow; a much less important place than even the West Indies or India. Hence the priority described to it was always lower this worked to the Americans’ advantage. In the war of 1812 Britain fought a holding action for the first two years and only sent substantial reinforcements once Napoleon had been defeated. Britain was also very keen to make peace with the United States on generous terms even though it had developed military superiority. A tougher negotiation stance could have seen a large part of New York state remaining in British hands had they not decided that they wanted to be shot of the American distraction. Had the British point during the conflict decided that the maintenance of America was key to their great power status, the course of various conflicts might have been different. It should be clear that had Britain not faced most of the rest of Europe’s hostility without any significant allies she would have crushed the revolt in the same way that she crushed later revolts In Canada, India, South Africa and other parts of the empire. An even starker contrast is provided by Italy. Never in the field of a struggle of independence have so few of the liberated people been involved in the struggle and so unsuccessfully. Italian armies were crushed in 1848 and 1849. The Italians managed to have a battle fought on their behalf which was solely fought by the French in 1859 (Solferino) and they managed to lose in 1866 at Custozza and Lissa. They were the beneficiaries of the Franco- Prussian war in 1870 and they managed to gain more territory after the First World War despite being crushed at Caporreto. The difference between 1848-9 and later Italian defeats was that between 1859 and 1918 the Italians had a series of powerful allies who invariably helped them along. The saying went that the Italians gained more by losing their way towards in independence than the Germans by winning their way towards independence If the Italians could reach the dizzying heights of military incompetence rarely equalled outside the literature of the good soldier Schweik and still gain independence how could the South with all its bravery and heroism fail to do so? The scales of power between the North and South were so finely balanced for most of the war that any foreign intervention or recognition could have tipped the balance. What happened in Europe and the attitude towards the American civil war forms the rest of this article. First I need to introduce the principal countries in the mid 19th century. These were Great Britain France, Russia, Austria and Prussia. The Italian state was emerging but could not be considered a great power. The Ottoman Empire was still controlling large parts of the Balkans but could also not be considered a great power. The 19th century, or at least the period from 1815-1914 was unusual because it is considered a period of relative peace in Europe. The period 1815-1848 saw no major great power military confrontation. The period 1878-1914 also saw no wars which involved two great powers, therefore for nearly 70 years Europe was at peace. The middle period 1848-1878 saw sporadic warfare. Generally the wars were limited in both aims duration and effect. With the exception of the Crimean war, no more than two great powers were ever involved. Secondly all the wars were of limited aims: these were not wars of annihilation but ones for limited territorial acquisition. Generally the casualties were not high compared to the American Civil War; the one exception being Crimea where unreliable estimates put the death toll at nearly half a million people, mainly through disease. The Crimean War is typical of the 19th century wars fought in several respects; the effects on civilians were limited, it never became a general war and was settled on compromised terms. Armies in Europe were generally professional and so Von Moltke’s comment on the American Civil War being carried out by two mobs was indicative of European views on the professionalism in America. In looking at the European attitude to America, one needs to discard the 20th and 21st century view of America being the central and predominant world power. In the 19th century this was definitely not the case. America was seen as important but not key to any European countries fortunes. Therefore issues in Europe would always have a demand greater attention from European statesmen than events in America. It was therefore to the North’s benefit that the American Civil War happened during a period when Europe was preoccupied with its own affairs and did not have the will to intervene in the American civil war. We now need to introduce the main protagonists Prussia Of the five great powers; Prussia was not really involved in extra European affairs being at this stage the weakest of the European great powers. We tend to think of Prussia as this great military power which it does become shortly after the end of the American Civil War, however for most of this period it was considered as a fairly weak power. Its mobilization in 1859 had been chaotic, there had been huge political dissention over an army bill to strengthen it and its attentions were directed at Denmark and then Austria. It had neither the capacity nor the will to make an ark outside Europe. Its desire for a place in the sun is sometime off in the future. Austria Austria’s involvement was dynastic rather than state as Franz -Josef’s brother became Emperor of Mexico. Had circumstances played out differently it was conceivable that Austria could have become involved but it was more concerned with its recent loss in Italy and the rising power of Prussia in northern Europe. Austria was the most overextended power trying to hold onto her position in Germany, regain her position in Italy whilst extending her influence in the near east. As Franz-Josef and his ministers were unable to decide between their priorities, they failed in all of them during the 1860’s. The Austrian empire was not strong enough to defend all its interests without assistance from another power. Austria was faced with the dilemma that it could rely on Prussia to defend itself against France only if it could concede hegemony in Germany to Prussia. It could expand into Romania only if it conceded Venetia to Italy. Austria had become a revisionist power like Prussia and Russia wanting to reverse the position in Italy. Austria had suffered from the defeats both to itself and its allies in Italy which resulted in the loss of Lombardy and the unification of Italy. Austria was overstretched. It could not defend its position in Germany, Italy and the near-east simultaneously. Franz-Josef’s tragedy was that he could never make a decision on his priorities which meant he lost in all three areas. Italy Italy was the newly established kingdom but could hardly be described as a major power. The unfinished business of unification in Venetia and Rome was to cause major issues for both Austria and France. Russia This left Russia which of all the powers consistently took a pro- northern line. The Russians took a pro-northern line because they saw the north as a counter-balance to Britain and wanted a strong power in North America apart from Britain Czar Alexander II was generally hostile to Britain, which was understandable given the legacy of the Crimean war. There was a short lived Franco-Russian entente at the beginning of the American Civil War, this was directed at Austria but Britain ever suspicious of French motives was alarmed by this. The famous Russian fleet visit in the autumn of 1863 to the north was undoubtedly caused by sympathy to the north but also by the Polish revolt which will be explained later. Revolutions of 1848 and their aftermath The beginning of the period of instability was set off by the revolutions in 1848 and those revolutions certainly aided the north. Along with the Irish potato famine that encouraged millions of immigrants most economically and politically to come to the United States and of course most came to the north states but of course some did come to the South. There is the famous incident in Fredericksburg where battalions of Irish ancestry face each other at the stone wall. However most immigrants went to the north and increased the imbalance of population which was crucial for northern success. Had for example, a civil war been provoked at the time of the nullification crisis in 1832/3 then the population distribution would have been much more even. The failure of the revolts of 1848 brought many famous refugees to America, the famous ones include Franz Sigel, a future political general whose sole aim (according to Lincoln scholars) was to encourage German-Americans to join the Union army. Although if there were a few more Franz Sigel’s on the Union side the South would definitely have won. Features of the 1860’s The alignments of the great powers were quite fluid, unlike at the close of the 19th century. The combination of Britain, France, Austria, Russia and Prussia could have combined in any number of different ways. There were neither fixed alliances nor indeed fixed hostilities. These did not occur until after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. Britain generally worked with France during this period but that did not stop the odd war scare. What made the 1860’s so unusual and dangerous was that four of the five major powers were revisionist. In other words powers dissatisfied with current boundaries and treaties. Before 1850 only France was an unsatisfied power seeking to reverse the territorial restrictions of the treaty of Vienna. However by 1860 only Britain wanted no change. 1. The Crimean war made Russia a revisionist power as it wanted to reverse the session of land at the delta of the river Danube to Turkey and more importantly the Black Sea clauses which made her defenceless on the Black Sea coast. 2. In 1859 Austria also became a revisionist power looking to reverse its losses in Italy. 3. Prussia became a revisionist power in the 1850’s as it sought parity if not superiority in German affairs with Austria. 4. Italy wanted to annex Rome and Venetia. 5. French ambitions to expand on the Rhineland were opposed by Prussia and Britain. 6. Italian plans to expand to take Rome was opposed by France, however Italia’s plans to occupy Venetia was supported by France but opposed by Austria. 7. Russian plans to reverse the Black Sea clauses were opposed by France and Britain. 8. Austria’s wish to expand in the Balkans was opposed by France and Russia. The 1860’s did not see the predominance of any great ideological split. If that had been the case then the three northern courts, Austria, Prussia and Russia might have combined against France but this never happened. The 1860’s in summary was a dangerous period which kept Europe fully occupied. The two powers which had most to gain or lose from the American Civil War were Britain and France. The major question was whether either of the two western maritime powers France of Britain would seek an advantage through a forward policy in America. France had no substantial possessions in the American continent but Britain had Canada with its long indefensible border. The U.S-Canadian border had been agreed in the 1840’s when Lord Elgin had managed to persuade senators to agree to the border based on the 49th parallel. This was agreed partly by using the divide and rule strategy. Elgin persuaded the southern senators that if America acquired large amount of territory in the north this would be to their significant disadvantage. Through the judicious use of funds and entertainment the treaty was carried on a sea of champagne. There were those however in the north who envisaged their Manifest Destiny to cover the whole North American continent. With the conquest of California and large parts of south-west America, this seemed to be an achievable prospect. Britain of course had some experience of trying to defend Canada both in the American Revolution and the war of 1812. By the 1860’s, colonies were considered by many including Disraeli as a millstone round our necks. The 1860’s interestingly saw a movement against imperial expansion, which is often forgotten when the late Victorian acquisition of more territory is considered. British statesmen did not particularly value colonies in this period. Costly to establish costly to maintain, and, when they reached maturity would demand autonomy if not independence. This was the time in which the doctrines of free trade were almost universally adopted and Great Britain was the apostle of the free trade ideal and if free trade was really free why did you need the expense of colonies? It was in the 1860’s that Britain gave up its possessions in the Ionian Islands and considered giving up its West African possessions as a result of the Cardwell report. Therefore Britain had no wish to add to its commitments in the North American continent. It really wanted to see a peaceful continent where it could trade profitably. The Monroe tariff introduced by Lincoln was tiresome but certainly not a Causus belli. As we shall see incidents concerning naval matters were more of an issue where Britain and the north exchanged traditional roles. Britain was the neutral and the North was the belligerent. Britain sought to work with Napoleon III where possible in order to restrain his policies. The two powers had worked together during the Crimean war 1854-56 even though the British commander Raglan had a habit of referring to the enemy as the French when he really meant the Russians. Perhaps this was understandable as Raglan had lost an arm at Waterloo. A more concerning event for the British was expansion of France as part of the pact of Piedmont whereby France gained parts of Savoy and Nice as the price for supporting Piedmont against Austria. Britain was always concerned with the French expansion and whereas minor expansion in Italy may cause concern, expansion on the Rhineland or even more so in the Low Countries would cause alarm. Britain therefore looked to work with France as a fellow liberal power but the not so secret agenda was to contain her expansionism. Having looked briefly at the countries we should now look at the main players. The prime minister of the United Kingdom was Palmerston. A Whig who had become a liberal; Palmerston was by no means a radical. His reputation had become inextricably linked to the apogee of British influence and power. A colourful character disliked by the Queen because he tended to keep her less informed of foreign policy than she would have wished. Palmerston had a long period in government and had been instrumental in British support for the independence of Belgium in 1830. Palmerston was also well known for his defence of British citizens, shown most famously by the Don Pacifico affair where the Royal Navy bombarded a town in Greece in order to defend Don Pacifico’s rights leading to the famous phrase by Palmerston “Civis Britannicus sum”. The Foreign Secretary was Lord John Russell who had been Prime Minister and was in a some what uneasy partnership with Palmerston in the Government. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was Gladstone and the Secretary for War was Cornwell Lewis. These men would play a key role in the diplomacy of the era, and their personalities would reflect the different views of supporting both the North and the South. The British had a considerable presence in North America. There was a well staffed embassy in Washington as well as consular services in major cities both North and South. This allowed the British government to keep in touch with both the confederates and the northern government during the war. One of the most important diplomats was Robert Bunch who was British consul in Charleston, South Carolina. The government of France was dominated by the emperor Napoleon III. An interesting character; he is seen as the first of modern dictators using referendums and modern methods of spin to maintain himself in power. If there was a potential disturber of the peace Napoleon III was the most likely candidate. As we have seen he was determined to gain glory for his regime both internally and externally. Internally, he carried out grand projects like the remodelling of Paris. Externally he wanted to overturn the treaty of Vienna. He had already taken part in the Crimean war and had assisted Italy in expelling the Habsburgs from Lombardy. This was a regime which needed domestic and foreign success in order to justify its existence. Although Napoleon III was clearly not as reckless as Napoleon I, there was a constant anxiety on behalf of the great powers that Napoleon would disturb the peace. Britain had an almost schizophrenic approach to Napoleon; cooperating with him sometimes as in the Crimean war and sometimes opposing him as in the great fortress building crisis. In the period 1859-61 Britain embarked on a large fortress building programme because we were worried about the possibility of a French invasion. Forts like Brockhurst, another of “Palmerston’s follies”, were a line of forts built in the early 1860’s to defend Portsmouth against a French invasion. It is not clear why the building of these forts was necessary but it was a sign of tension in 1859 when they were started. Fort Brockhurst is interesting to those who wish to study American forts as it is built in a similar way to those used in the American Civil War. A sign of better relations was the Cobden-Chevalier treaty which encouraged trade between the two countries. However, there were three invasion scares; in 1849: in 1852-3: and one in 1859-60. The construction of the forts was encouraged by a royal commission in 1859. Thankfully, the follies were never put to the test. But we should note that at a time when government expenditure was more tightly controlled than it is now; that a large sum of money was spent in peacetime on the construction of these forts. It is indicative of the tension between the nations. One needs to think of the image of Napoleon the III as he was perceived before his humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian war. To put it in 20th century terms, if a man claiming to be a descendant of the Kaiser had come to power in Germany 40 years after the end of the First World War and as venerating his memory and achievements, you could imagine this would cause no end of fuss in Britain. Similarly the name Napoleon was a red-rag to a bull for most Britons. The same view was of suspicion was held by the other “Chaumont” powers of Europe. So named after the treaty of Chaumont of 1814 which put paid to Napoleon. Russia, Prussia, Austria and Britain still combined against France. As late as 1840 in the Mehmet Ali crisis France was isolated. The accession of Napoleon III in 1851 did not reduce the natural suspicions of France. Napoleon III however was much more a subtle statesmen than his uncle and until his last years when his judgement was clouded by illness he kept France in alliance with Britain or another major power. However the name was always an issue and Napoleon’s desire to bolster his regime through “Gloire” was always a destabilizing factor in European politics. There were in this period three completely unscrupulous statesmen, Bismarck, Victor Emmanuel and Napoleon III. Ultimately two of them were highly successful and the other was not In the period 1861-65 there were four major events in Europe; the first was the aftermath of the Risorgimento, the second was the Polish Revolt in 1863, the third was the Schleswig Holstein crisis and the fourth was the build up of the Austro-Prussian rivalry which was to culminate in the war in 1866. As indicated before, when there was a crisis in Europe this would always take priority over American events. Therefore events in Eastern and Central Europe would effect the amount of attention that the powers could spare for America but it was in truth only the two western maritime powers, England and France who were likely to intervene in the American civil war Throughout this period it was France and Britain who were most directly affected by the American civil war. These powers were both maritime had extensive colonial possessions and a degree of industrialisation although Britain’s was much more advanced than France. This meant that they would be affected much more by any cotton embargo than the rest of Europe. Britain was also no longer self sufficient in food stuffs and therefore was increasingly dependent on grain from the mid-west. In a tactic that would be repeated 110 years later in the Yom Kippur war by OPEC using oil the South sought to gain leverage by restricting the export of its cotton. During the Civil War, British politicians thoughts would always be filled with cotton, Canada, conduct on the high seas, the fear of being embroiled in a war and the potential gains and losses from any participation. The first major decision was an inevitable one that led the recognition of the south as a belligerent power. The belligerence status was needed to be given to the south otherwise southern ships would be seen as pirates and therefore outside international law. On the 13th of May 1861 before the ambassador Charles Francis Adams could present his credentials, the British government announced both its neutrality in the conflict and accorded the South belligerent status. This was treated by the north as an unfriendly act. Seward, the American Secretary of State, had once said to the Duke of Newcastle that he saw it as his role to insult Britain. This joke was taken seriously by some and was thought to be a harbinger of northern ill will. Most of 1861 past peacefully on the diplomatic front. The South won the first battle of Manassas in July 1861 but the North prevailed in a number of other theatres of war. In 1861 the glut of cotton produced before the outbreak of hostilities meant that the break in supplies was actually a boom to the mill owners. In that year there were not only surplus bails of raw cotton which were ironically sold to the North but also there had been an oversupply of manufactured goods. The original southern agents Yancey and Rhost were both militant advocates of slavery and therefore did not make much headway in the diplomatic arena. The main British attitude was; 1. To remain neutral, 2. That given the size of the rebellion there was inevitability to the separation of north and south, 3. That there was no point in recognising the south until it had established its ability to defend itself, 4. That recognition of the South would not lead to a lifting of the blockade. Whereas the North would have seen recognition as a “Causus belli” with the Britons but this was no reason to link recognition with aid to the South. It is also perhaps instructive to note that there was considerable correspondence between Palmerston and Gladstone where Palmerston has talked about the necessity of spending money to update the accommodation of soldiers in barracks. So even at an early stage, Britain was looking at the state of her armed forces. The Trent Affair The major disturbance in 1861 which nearly brought Britain and the North to war was the Trent Affair. This was caused by the clash on the high seas between the North as the belligerent power and Britain as the neutral. For those who appreciate irony of course this was the one occasion when the normal roles were reversed and Britain found itself on the receiving end of a blockade. The North declared a blockade in 1861 of Southern ports. For the first few months, this blockade was not much more than a paper one as the United States had an even smaller navy than its army. The effectiveness of the blockade was mainly due to Southerners refusing to sell cotton. However by the end of 1861 the North was able to put more forces into the blockade. Blockade running was a very profitable business. Nine out of ten blockade runners were British ships sailing under the British flag. The challenge was for the Northern navy to stop the flow of goods in and out of the south. Enter Captain Wilkes of the San-Jacinto. The South had decided to replace its rather ineffective representatives with two more able commissioners, Mason and Slidell who were bound for Britain and France respectively. During a rather circuitous journey the packet steamer Trent was intercepted by the San-Jacinto and Mason and Slidell were forcibly removed from there and taken as captives. This caused a dangerous diplomatic incident. Captain Wilkes received a vote of thanks from Congress and was feted throughout the North. However he had committed a serious error in his action in that he had summarily taken Mason and Slidell prisoner but had not taken the Trent to a Northern port, probably New York, to determine the legality of his action. Britain reacted very strongly and as we know a strongly worded dispatch was prepared by Russell and Palmerston and was amended by Prince Albert as one of his last political duties. It was quite lucky that the telegraph which had been laid in 1858 between Britain and America was not working. It meant that it would take time for dispatches to be received and this allowed for tempers to cool. Initially the omens still did not look good: Britain’s flag had been insulted and she had been challenged on the high seas where she was mistress. Palmerston was not a Prime minister who would back down from this type of challenge and over 11,000 troops were rushed to Canada. From the 8th of November 1861 for a period of nearly two months there was a chance of war. The British government was deadly serious and her actions included delivering several ship loads of previously ordered goods to the South under armed escort. The nation girded its loins for war. However the amending of the dispatch gave Seward a way out by agreeing that Captain Wilkes’ actions were unauthorized so offering a face-saving way of the actions of Wilkes to be reversed. Eventually the American cabinet met on Christmas Day to determine whether to release the commissioners as Britain demanded. The interesting factor is that it took two days of discussion before the cabinet agreed. Given that a war with Britain would have certainly led to the South gaining independence, it is surprising that it took so long for the North to decide. Eventually Lincoln’s doctrine of 'one war at a time' prevailed and the cabinet agreed to release the commissioners but interestingly enough did not make an apology for their actions. At this point it is worth considering how the major Northern politicians were viewed by outsiders, one needs to remember that Lincoln was not considered either inside or outside America as the giant which he posthumously became. If you're thinking of a modern equivalent it is George Bush. Inside the country many thought of Lincoln as country bumpkin. His witticisms while pleasing to the modern ear were deemed unsuitable and inappropriate in the 19th century. Lincoln is certainly is more attractive to a 21st century mind than a 19th. The Gettysburg Address is a good example, at the time it was thought to be inappropriately short. It was only later that it gained its iconic status. This lack of respect was not only in the country at large but also within his own party; Seward who Lincoln had defeated for the presidency certainly looked down on Lincoln as did much of the rest of his Cabinet. Seward, an ambitious politician from New York started off being aggressive in his outlook on Britain. He had opposed a war against Britain for Canada as a way of reuniting America. However as he settled into the job he became more adept at diplomacy for which the North was very much indebted. At the end of 1861 the Royal Navy had approximately 339 ships; the North had 264 ships, most of which had been adapted from civilian use. Lincoln was correct to determine that he should fight one war at a time but the surprising fact is that it took him a day and a half to convince his cabinet. No other nation was involved in this eyeball to eyeball confrontation. Some commentators have played down the Trent Affair and have said that war was never likely. This underestimates the ability of seemingly small events to spin out of control leading the protagonists down a route which they did not wish to succeed. Prime examples of this were: the war of 1812, the Crimean war and the Franco-Prussian war. Great wars can be built on trivial foundations. The timing issue on the war of 1812 was that Britain had agreed to the U.S president Madison’s demands but this had not been in time to stop the war. In the Crimea, the occupation of the Danubian Principalities. which was the causus belli had ended before a shot was fired in the war. The best example is the way in which Bismarck played an opposite role to Prince Albert, in amending the famous Ems Telegram to make it provocative and bringing on war with the French. The effect of the Trent Affair was ironically to benefit the North. Britain realised how difficult it would be to defend Canada from Northern attack, this was one of the reasons why generally Britain was more cautious in dealing with the North than the adventurous Napoleon III, who had no such commitments. During the early part of 1862 Northern successes such as the capture of New Orleans and the advance of McClellan down the Peninsular, Britain and Europe were prepared to bide their time. The one disturbance was the infamous Ben Butler order in New Orleans. It would be far to say that however even at this stage most of British and European opinion was that the reunification of America was impossibility. The Ben Butler order not only led to correspondence between Palmerston and Adams but it also seemed to prove to many the impossibility of reunification. Even if the North prevailed militarily, it would not be able to maintain its hold over the South but so long as the North was winning no one was prepared to intervene. Ironically the Trent Affair, by focusing minds on the consequences of intervention, had made it less likely. The hasty despatch of troops to Canada; the realisation that the loss of Northern trade and foodstuffs would have on the economy made British statesmen more cautious. When the time came for potential intervention the experience of the Trent Affair tipped the balance against intervention. Britain had recognised regimes which were not free of attempts to quash there independence, notably Belgium and Greece. In those circumstances, however Britain had actively taken sides. The victories of the South from Seven Days through second Manassas did seem to offer an opportunity fro mediation followed by the recognition of Southern independence. It should also be noted that 1862 not 1863 appears to be the high water mark of the Confederacy as it advanced not only on the eastern from but also in the western campaign relieving Vicksburg and extending its military campaign into Kentucky. You may recall that Lincoln once said he wanted to have God on his side but he had to have Kentucky. In the autumn of 1862 the North was facing defeat in both the east and the west. There had been a number of moves in July 1862 to recognise the South. Before Parliament adjourned there was Roebuck’s motion on the 18th of July 1862 which called for the recognition of the South. Palmerston and Russell opposed this on the basis that they thought it was premature and carried the House of Commons and the motion was withdrawn without a vote. The motion was debated at a time when McClellan’s rebuff in front of Richmond was filtering through to London. However this was not the decisive victory that might have forced the hand of the British government. It was General Lee who commented that under normal circumstances the army of the Potomac would have been destroyed. However due to the mishandling of a number of tactical offensives by the South the Northern army escaped destruction. It sheltered in July 1862 under the protection of the gunboats on the James River. It was unfortunate for the South and fortunate for the North that the victory at Second Manassas took place during the parliamentary recess. Had Parliament been in session at the time of such a sweeping victory, government action would have been considerably stronger. Nevertheless action towards recognition was again being mooted in September 1862. At various points Palmerston, Russell, Gladstone, Napoleon III, Thovenel his foreign minister, and Stokal the Russian diplomat in Washington, all contemplated mediation followed by recognition of the South. Why did this not happen? It was contemplated because as Bruce Catton once put it “as the line of Southern success went up and the cotton stocks went down there was a point at which intervention became attractive”. The reason why a decisive intervention didn’t happen is due as much to luck, miscoordination, mutual suspicion and a turn of events in the war as any inevitability. Russell writes to Palmerston suggesting intervention. Palmerston replies in a positive at that point it was thought that Washington and Baltimore might fall into Confederate hands. The position of Russell and Palmerston in the government as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary was dominant so why did recognition policy die? One needs to remember that these two individuals born in the 18th century and who had lived through the Napoleonic wars and were still very much conditioned by that experience. Palmerston had entered politics at the time of the battle of Jena (1806). These two men with long experience had become more cautious but still retained a fear of the French. They did not want to act on their own and make Britain the sole target for Northern revenge. With Canada effectively a hostage, this seemed quite a likely occurrence. Britain may have therefore wanted to act with France. France under Napoleon III had been more sympathetic to Confederate causes and was also suffering from a cotton shortage. It was then that events in Europe intervened. The unfinished business of Italian unification became a crisis for the French government. France had gained Nice and Savoy which only added to Britain suspicion. Due to Catholic pressure become the protector of the Pope’s temporal power, French troops protected the Pope and his Roman territory from the spectre of Italian unification. The French needed to keep troops there and like in many occasions it is easier to put troops in than withdraw them. French troops in Rome became a source of instability and a divisive factor. The Italian crisis caused a paralysis in the ministry at just the moment that Russell was seeking support for his intervention. Thouvenel gave a non-committal reply to the mediation effort in early September 1862. This caused a pause for reflection and Palmerston decided to wait until the expected battle in Maryland had been decided. It is perhaps interesting to note that if Lee had not fought the battle of Antietam that Russell might have persisted with his mediation proposal. Alternative scenarios Consider this: a successful raid into Maryland following the relieving of Shenandoah Valley the successful capture of Harpers Ferry followed by a successful retirement south of the army would not have caused the pause for thought which the bloody stalemate at Antietam caused. It was not that the North won at Antietam which they did not. But the battle showed Northern determination to prosecute the war and that it was unlikely to heed a call for mediation. If mediation and recognition was taken as a hostile act by the North, then this was a risk that the cabinet did not wish to take. Chief amongst the opponents to any intervention was Cornwell Lewis who was Secretary of State for war. Keenly aware of the difficulties which the British armies would face in any confrontation of the North he spoke both in cabinet and openly against any deviation from strict neutrality. After Russell and Palmerston had decided to postpone any decision on intervention, Gladstone make a speech in Newcastle stating that Jefferson Davis was creating an army and a navy but more importantly than either, a nation. This speech coming after Russell and Palmerston had rejected immediate recognition lacked the support to force a change of policy. When the cabinet met the proposal was turned down and those in favour of mediation were left isolated. Palmerston remained on the sidelines while nearly every Cabinet minister apart from Russell and Gladstone talked it down. At the point at which the Russell mediation plan was being considered the French foreign ministry was about to undergo a change. Thouvenel had wanted to extract French troops from Rome where they were protecting the Pope. His idea was for the Italian capital of Italy to move to Florence as the final capital and there was a difference of opinion in that Thouvenel saw this as the Italians renouncing their claim on Rome and therefore allowing the French troops to withdraw with honour. The French clericals and the Empress Eugenie thought that his proposal was a step leading to the Italian acquisition of Rome. Napoleon III therefore dismissed Thouvenel and appointed Drouyn de Lhuys. Had the Italian crisis not happened during the autumn of 1862, Russell’s mediation initiative might have received a more immediate and conclusive support from France. It was the Confederacy's misfortune that on the one occasion when the British were prepared to lead a mediation effort rather than the French, the Italian crisis temporarily paralysed French efforts. In the following month (November 1862), the French having resolved the Italian crisis, made an initiative on intervention which is then turned down by the British. Had the French and the leading members of the British cabinet agreed at the same time on mediation it might well have happened. Conventional wisdom thinks that the Emancipation Proclamation on September 22nd led to a change in European attitudes. This is somewhat over-simplistic as emancipating slaves where the Union had no control and keeping them in bondage where the Union did have control did not appeal morally or diplomatically in Europe. It was seen as a desperate attempt by the North to incite a servile war. The attitude over slavery did start to change with the Second Emancipation Proclamation on January 1st, 1863. This reaffirmed the determination of the North to seek the end of slavery. It would therefore be fair to say the Emancipation Proclamation had a cumulative effect which grew as the war progressed and it became clear that slavery would be abolished in the Border States as well. In reviewing the events of the autumn of 1862 one is struck by how easily they could have led to mediation followed by recognition of the South. Had the Confederate victories at Second Manassas whilst Parliament was sitting; had Lee not decided to fight at Sharpsburg; had Special Order 191 not been lost; had the French not been in a ministerial crisis when Russell first mooted the mediation proposal then the mediation proposal may have come forward as a joint Franco-British initiative along with some support from the rest of Europe. Again there is a danger in pre-judging or judging with hindsight the point at which the Confederacy’s fortunes fell into terminal decline. With the gift of hindsight one can see that the high water mark was in the autumn of 1862 when the South had success in both the eastern and western theatres. It was not only Baltimore that was threatened but also Cincinnati on the Ohio. The setbacks of the Confederacy were noted by British ministers who used that as an opportunity to delay any move to mediation until they were convinced that the North would give way. It is fair to say that Seward played a difficult hand well. Any reasonable analysis would show that the North could not hope to fight a war on two fronts The sides were too evenly balanced and any intervention at any point before the November 1864 elections would have led to Southern independence. But it might have also led to the loss of Canada. There was however a difference between being reluctant to establish new colonies or indeed invest to much in old ones as opposed to giving them up through force. In a similar attitude to that displayed over the Falklands: colonies might be a millstone but if threatened then the prestige and honour of the country demanded that they must be defended at substantial costs if necessary. To that extent the possession of Canada made Britain more cautious in their attitude rather than assume a forward policy which would gain greater territory for British North America. The Polish Revolt The next crisis in Europe during the time of the American Civil War was the Polish crisis. Middle class liberalism had reached its high water mark in 1861 as Italy had been more or less united under a constitutional monarchy, Austria had a new parliament and Frederick William IV had died which seemed to portend a new era. This liberalism was not to last long. Poland had been partitioned in three great segments at the end of the 18th century so from 1795 the Polish state ceased to exist. A puppet Grand Duchy of Warsaw was brought into being by Napoleon I. After Napoleon I’s defeat in 1816 Russia gained most of Poland which the Czar was supposed to rule separately from his Russian territories. The first Polish revolt was put down in 1831. The second Polish revolt started on the 23 January 1863. The Russian authorities had been worried about the spread of liberalism after the Italian unification. The Russians reacted by trying to draft Polish radicals into the army. This led to the outbreak of the revolt. The revolt was in Russian territory but Prussia and Austria which controlled parts if Poland were not unaffected. Galicia and Posen were part of the Austrian and Prussian empires respectively. Napoleon III saw this as an opportunity to resurrect the traditional Franco-Polish alliance. Once more Prussia and Russia were on one side and Austria, England and France on the other. France’s interest was led by the radicals who wanted to defend the principals of nationality and by the clericals who wanted to defend the Catholics from Orthodox Christians. Austria and Prussia as German powers did not want to see France expand in the Rhineland but there was some mileage in Prussia using the French threat to Austrian possessions in Italy to try and extract concessions from Austria in Germany. Austria and Prussia combined against the Danes in 1864. Russia wanted to reverse the Black Sea clauses which she had to agree at the end of the Crimean war. Her attitude to Austria was one of suspicion. Prussia wanted hegemony in northern Germany. Austria was not prepared to concede anything to Prussia without war. Napoleon III, having gained Nice and Savoy was the most satisfied but was still intriguing to extend influence and territory. Having destroyed the inner compact against France he now sought to increase his influence and territory. France had emerged from the Italian War of Unification in a strong diplomatic position which it managed to fritter away over the 1860’s. France scored a success in containing Austria in the near east; there was a revolt against the sixth power in Europe, the Ottoman Empire. There was a revolt in Serbia; mounting disorders in European Turkey. In July 1862 the French and Russians had agreed an entente under which Russia recognised the Kingdom of Italy. In return France agreed that the Danubian Principalities practically independent of the Ottoman Empire without falling into Austria’s orbit. It also meant that Austria received no help from Russia in either Italy or Germany. As long as the events in the near east were to the fore, Russia and France could make an entente. This of course alarmed Britain and meant that Britain was even more suspicious of making any diplomatic stands in America without the support of other European powers. The Polish revolt in 1863 had more effect on European relations than any other revolt in the 19th century. Russia obviously wished to suppress the revolt caused by conscription of Poles in the Russian army. France was forced to show some solidarity for its ancient ally of the Poles. France even proposed an expedition against Russian occupied Poland to support the Polish rebels. Austria had no wish to offend Britain and France and therefore did not cooperate with Russia in suppressing the revolt. When Bismarck signed a convention with the Russians to cooperate against the Poles this provoked the French to threaten the Prussians with war if they continued to assist in suppressing the Poles. This led to the French seeking an alliance with the Austrians against the Russians and Prussians. This caused a re-creation of the Crimean alliance of Austria, France and England. The Polish Revolt rumbled through until the autumn of 1863 when it petered out. However the diplomatic damage had been done when Austria, Britain and France protested against the Russian treatment of the Poles on 17 April 1863. Gorchkov the Foreign Minister was prepared to agree to a European congress to discuss the Polish issue. However this was not enough for the French who delivered a further note in June 1863 (after the battle of Chancellorsville, before the battle of Gettysburg) proposing the creation of an autonomous Polish state and an immediate armistice in Poland. The six conditions for the agreement of the congress would be: 1. A general amnesty 2. A Polish national assembly 3. Autonomous administration run by Poles 4. Removal of limitations on the Roman Catholic church 5. Exclusive use of Polish in government and legal machinery 6. Military service, governed by the law. When Gorchkov brushed aside these proposals there was a possibility that war would follow, there was talk of a French expeditionary force landing in Poland with Swedish help. This was a similar proposal to that that had been aired at the latter end of the Crimean war. It was in this context that the Russian fleet visited New York and San Francisco: it was a considerable boost to Northern morale showing that they were supported by at least one power. This can of course be overstated as Alexander II was fearful for the future of his navy should a war with Britain and France on one side (potentially supported by Austria) and Russia on the other. Whilst the Polish crisis led to a boost in Northern morale or be it that the public were labouring under a misapprehension that the Russians were supporting them, it led to difficulties for the South in that, despite the substantial successes of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville and Winchester, the South was able to make little diplomatic progress. The Polish Revolt led to the spectre of a general European war. The French proposal for an attack on Russian fell through because Britain was not prepared to support it. British foreign policy appears paralysed, we did not wish to act in America for fear of problems in Europe and we did not wish to act in Europe for fear of what might happen in America. This reflected in general paralysis and isolation in Europe in the 1860’s, in British foreign policy compared to the 1850’s and latter part of the 1870’s. British foreign policy is considerably more passive and that had much to do with the uncertainty in America. Blockade Runners In 1863 the one realistic chance for the South would have been a war which could have arisen as a result of the construction of blockade runners in British shipyards used by the South. Two famous blockade runners, the Oreto (which became the commerce raider Florida) and number 290 (which became the commerce raider Alabama) escaped from British shipyards and were armed outside Britain crewed partially by British sailors, and engaged in substantial commerce raiding against Northern shipping. This had the advantage for Britain that most of the American marine transferred to the British flag and therefore gave Britain a substantial commercial advantage. The difficulty for Russell was that the Foreign Enlistment Act prevented ships from being built and armed for warlike purposes for sail to a belligerent for whom her majesty was at peace; the difficulty was that Confederate agents built ships without weaponry which were then converted to commerce destroyers. Moreover the power of the government was limited to confiscating ships where a breach in the Foreign Enlistment Act had occurred, a pre-emptive strike was not legal, in the case of the Alexandria the British government seized the ship but the courts ruled against the government. The Florida and the Alabama caused considerable destruction of Northern shipping. More serious were the threats from the new ships known as the Laird rams. In response to the activities of the Alabama and the Florida, Congress had passed a bill authorising Lincoln to issue 'letters of marque' which would allow for Northern privateers to raid commerce. America had not been a signatory to the Treaty of Paris which outlawed privateering. The problem was that as a belligerent, profiteering should had been directed against Southern shipping but as there was negligible Southern shipping and as most goods were carried by British ships this would lead to mayhem on the high seas and would inevitable involved the North and Britain in a shooting match. An equivalent could be seen in Roosevelt’s "shoot on site" policy in 1941 against German shipping whilst America was not at war with Germany. However Britain would not have been able to ignore this aggression and war would have inevitably resulted. War in 1863 would probably have been a considerably difficult undertaking than in 1861 because the North had military experience, had built up its army and navy and therefore the contest would have been somewhat more equal. Given the difficulties that the Union was having against the South, a war against the British would have been the last throw of the dice and would have almost again certainly resulted in southern independence. One is struck by the readiness of the North to invocate a form of Gotterdammerung in threatening to fight the British even when this would have lead to the loss of the South. The fact that the British never called the bluff reflects the caution of British policy in this era. Schleswig Holstein The final incident tin this period of significance was the Schleswig Holstein crisis which again showed British inability to influence events without using its latent military and economic might. Britain started off by supporting the Danes, and then withdrew that support leaving the Danes to be isolated and defeated in June 1864; on 25th June 1864 Britain resolved not to go to war by 8 votes to 6. FRANCE IN MEXICO????? Long term effects The outcome had three major effects: 1. The North was able to assist in crushing the attempt to set up a Mexican Empire under Maximilian. 2. This further estranged France from Austria as the unfortunate Maximilian was shot, 3. The British decide that a more formal conferedarated structure was required in its North American possessions and so the Dominion of Canada was born in 1867. The title of dominion was given rather than kingdom so that American sensibilities were effected 4. Democracy itself which had been partially on trial during the civil war was vindicated and led both indirectly and directly to pressure for reform of the franchise which had not been changed since 1832. In 1867 the Second Reform Bill was passed during the so called "leap in the dark". 5. In Britain the period of fluid government and fluid allegiances was soon to be superseded by the two party system which is well known to us today. Could the South have played its cards better? The South took a big risk in denying Europe cotton and thought that Europe would be forced into the war, Judah P Benjamin said after the war they underestimated the extent to which the government would let cotton workers become destitute rather than intervene to obtain the cotton supplies. Had the South sold cotton from the start, its financial problems which eventually overwhelmed it would have been much less. The South’s first choice of envoys, Yancey and Rhost were not perhaps the most fortunate choices both being fire-eating secessionists and pro-slavery. Also the expulsion by the south of the British Consuls was not a wise move as it did nothing to support their cause and cut off a conduit to the British Foreign Office. It also reinforced the idea that a secessionist South would not necessarily be friendly to Britain. An alternative strategy to involve Britain in the war could have been to plan cross-border raids from Canada into the north. Properly planned this could have led to increased tension that might have sparked a war. Ultimately however Southern diplomatic efforts were always at the mercy of other events and these were rarely propitious for European intervention. Why the Civil War had little effect on European military thinking The American Civil War is often seen as the last of the old fashioned wars and the first of the modern wars with barbed wire, trenches, rifled muskets, submarines and movement by railway features by the end of the war. Whereas the American Civil war lasted four years, none of the 19th century campaigns in1815-1914 lasted so long. The Crimean war lasted two years but most wars lasted a matter of weeks. Bismarck unified Germany in a series of three short wars. The unification of Italy was carried out in a series of short campaigns. The type of slogging match that the civil war descended into was not part of the 19th century European war experience. There was another reason for European indifference. The American armies were not professional and it was concluded that the inability to destroy the enemy even after winning a battle was due to the amateurishness of the organisation, the lack of suitable planning and a professional, well staffed General Staff It is notable that, with the possible exception of the Battle of Franklin, no army was destroyed in the manner of the French army at Sedan or the Austrian army at Sadowa. It was therefore often said that the European wars with their much larger numbers, greater firepower and greater training would be different. The remaining question is why Britain did not intervene to aid the south as a potential rival to the north. One might have supposed that Britain would be happy to see the colossus of the United States split into smaller powers; “Balkanisation in North America before it happened in the Balkans.” There were a number of reasons why Britain and other powers did not take a more active policy. The 1860’s was not a period in which imperialism was popular in government circles. Britain was looking to minimise its colonial activities and expenditure rather than increase its empire. America was seen as a valuable trading partner sharing in some important respects British values and outlook, in the words of Trollope,” their vices are our vices and their virtues are our virtues” was a common view held by the ruling classes in Britain. There was a fear that the splitting of north and south would be followed by the succession of the west and many political aftershocks which could affect British North America. As British statesmen indicated they might have been keener to support mediation efforts if Canada was not British and suggested that Napoleon III’s freedom of action was because he had no significant North American colonies. Moreover the British Consuls operating in the Southern Confederacy reported that after the initial enthusiasm of Britain, the failure to recognise the South had turned Southern public opinion very much against Britain. Little would be gained from an alliance with them. Britain was prepared to expend much blood and treasure in protecting and extending its Indian empire. However in other parts of the globe this willingness to use military power was absent. The humiliating retreat in the Schleswig-Holstein issue was a good example of this. Britain was even at the mid-Victorian height of its power aware of its limitations. The old men at the head of the government were cautious. The 1860’s was a period of fluctuating alliances and a period when Europe was reshaped. Had the American Civil War occurred eith |